Problems, possibilities face Korea's new president
By Ralph A. CossaKIM Dae-jung will be inheriting the South Korean presidency at the worst possible time and at the best possible time. It is the worst of times, given South Korea's dismal financial situation which will require harsh, politically unpopular remedies.
But it is the best of times since these remedies, which have been long overdue, have now been mandated by the IMF and accepted by the current (and thus by any future) ROK government. This provides the new president with a convenient scapegoat and a solid reason to pursue unpopular measures.
At one point in the campaign, candidate Kim had professed a desire to "renegotiate" the IMF conditions but quickly relented and fully understands that, especially in a democracy, binding agreements made by one administration automatically carry over to the next.
Nonetheless, President-elect Kim must send clear, unambiguous signals that he remains committed to the IMF bailout agreement. Failure to do so will exacerbate the current crisis.
More importantly, Kim needs to quickly establish a Special Economic Advisory Commission to help develop a long-term plan to institutionalize promised IMF reforms and ensure continued progress in liberalizing ROK trade and direct foreign investment policies through structural reform in the ROK business and financial sections.
It is among the domestic and international business communities that the greatest doubts about Kim's leadership abilities can be found. He must be proactive in allaying these concerns.
It is also the best of times since the recent inauguration of formal four-party peace talks (among the two Koreas, China and the U.S.) has presented the best opportunity for peace on the Peninsula since the breakdown in North-South talks in early 1993.
Kim has demonstrated more flexibility in discussing various approaches toward the North than almost any other South Korean politician. In a pre-election interview (in the Korea Herald on Dec. 12), he also underscored the central importance of maintaining a strong security system, even while engaging North Korea "to allay their fears and turn their isolation into openness and reform through inter-Korean talks and international aid."
To allay fears among his own people and among Korea's allies, Kim needs to repeat his strong support for the U.S.-ROK military alliance and work closely with the U.S. government in developing a coordinated, non-confrontational but firm and principled approach toward dealing with Pyongyang.
He has rightly observed that President Kim Young Sam's "lack of policy consistency" has resulted in "unnecessary conflict" and a "negative impact on U.S. confidence" in ROK policy.
Kim Dae-jung's election opens the door for the creation of a more flexible, imaginative, coordinated approach toward the North. This new approach should be aimed at further opening channels of communication between the South and North.
High priority should be given to increasing non-governmental organization and private sector access to and interaction with the North, including trade and investment, thereby encouraging a greater sense of interdependency between South and North. ROK and U.S. policies that inhibit or prohibit such actions should be reassessed.
Unilateral efforts and good will gestures - including but not limited to generous food aid in response to international appeals - should be considered, not as gifts but as a means of pursuing long-term interdependency objectives.
Humanitarian assistance should not be linked to other near-term political objectives (although insistence on more effective monitoring of distribution efforts is appreciated), however.
On the other hand, any substantial long-term benefits to be offered by the ROK or U.S., such as systemic reform of the North's agricultural sector, should be linked with specific actions or concession on the part of the North.
This can best be handled within the framework of the four-party talks' scheduled dialogue on North-South confidence- building measures.
In short, the presidential elections in the ROK provide an ideal opportunity both for a renewed endorsement of the centrality of a strong ROK-U.S. security relationship and for a comprehensive reassessment of U.S./ROK policy toward North Korea based on clearly identified mutually shared objectives.
While eventual peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula remains the unambiguous goal of both the Republic of Korea and the United States, policy emphasis today should be on creating the environment in the North that will make reunification possible over time.
This requires a long-term strategy; one that is aimed neither at propping up nor at hastening the collapse of the current North Korean regime. The near-term objective, instead, should be to facilitate coexistence while removing sources of tension and insecurity and fostering attitudinal changes among the people of the North.
For any long-term strategy to succeed, the ROK must first get its own house in order. This requires a sound economic plan aimed at implementing IMF reforms and promoting further economic liberalization.
It also requires a genuine effort to mend old political wounds that were reopened or deepened during the just-concluded and hotly contested presidential campaign.
Ralph A. Cossa is executive director
of the Pacific Forum/CSIS in Honolulu, a nonprofit,
foreign policy research institute affiliated
with the Center for Strategic and International Studies
in Washington, D.C.
